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Notes
Understanding the Difference Between
the Right to Subrogation and
Assignment of an Insurance Claim
Keisker v. Farmer'

I. INTRODUCTION
When an individual purchases an insurance policy, it is unlikely that the
insured possesses a solid understanding of the difference between the insurance
provider's right to subrogation, and an assignment of any claims to the provider.
In comparison, when a provider creates a policy it is probably aware of the
difference between these options, and the effects of this difference on future
claims. However, based on a recent Missouri Supreme Court case, Keisker v.
Farmer,2 it is apparent that not all insurance companies carefully consider the
difference between assignment and subrogation when establishing the terms of
their policies.3
Trinity Universal Insurance Company ("Trinity") wrote a policy that did not
expressly create an assignment of its policyholder's future claims and, as a result,
recovered only a fraction of the amount it paid to the policyholder.4 Had Trinity
carefully drafted its policy to create an assignment of the insured's claims, it
might have recovered the entire amount from those responsible for the damages.
For this reason, insurance companies need to understand the difference between
assignment and subrogation. Furthermore, insured individuals need to
understand this distinction so that they are aware of their own rights and
obligations.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Keisker v. Farmerdemonstrated the importance of distinguishing between
subrogation and assignment. Super Sandwich Shop, Inc. ("Shop") operated a
restaurant in a building leased from Ellen Keisker ("Keisker"). The lease
provided that Shop would insure Keisker and Shop against bodily injury and

1. 90 S.W.3d 71 (Mo. 2002).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 75.
5. Keisker v. Farmer, No. ED7868 1, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 7, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App.
Jan. 2, 2002).
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property damage. 6 Shop purchased $190,000 of insurance coverage through
Trinity, including $175,000 on the building and its contents, and $15,000 for
business interruption
On December 11, 1997, two cars driven by Harold Beck and Beatrice
Farmer hit the building, causing extensive damage.' The following day, Shop
reported these damages to Trinity, and Trinity subsequently paid Shop
$141,609.' Trinity's payment covered damage to both the building and the
business's personal property, and $15,000 for income lost due to the interruption
of business."0
One month after the accident, Shop sued the drivers of both cars." Shop
also sued the Sheriff's Department of the City of St. Louis ("Sheriff's
Department") and the City of St. Louis ("City") because the Sheriffs
Department employed Beck.12 Shop sought damages against all parties for loss
of income and profits due to the restaurant's closure after the car accident. 3
In the following year, Trinity's attorney sent several letters regarding its
subrogation rights.' 4 Trinity sent a letter to City's attorney, requesting protection
of its "subrogation lien in the event the third party claim/suit settles."' 5 Trinity

6. Id.
7. Id. The portion of the policy relevant to this case provided as follows:
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF RECOVERY AGAINST OTHERS TO US
If any person or organization to or for whom we make payment under this
Coverage Part has rights to recover damages from another, those rights are
transferred to us to the extent of our payment. That person or organization
must do everything necessary to secure our rights and must do nothing after
loss to impair them. But you may waive your rights against another party in
writing:
1.Prior to a loss to your Covered Property or Covered Income
2. After a loss to your Covered Property or Covered Income only if, at time
of loss, that party is one of the following:
a. Someone insured by this insurance;
b. A business firm:
(1) Owned or controlled by you; or
(2) That owns or controls you; or
c. Your tenant.
Keisker, 90 S.W.3d at 73.
8. Keisker, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 7, at *3.
9. Id.
10. Id. In addition, Shop paid a $500 deductible. Id.
11. Keisker, 90 S.W.3d at 73.
12. Keisker, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 7, at *3-4.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *4.
15. Id.
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also sent two letters to Shop's attorney.6 The first letter informed Shop that
Trinity had retained the attorney "with respect to its subrogation claim"; the
second stated that Trinity had a "valid right of subrogation" through the terms
of the insurance policy. 7 Trinity's use of the term "subrogation" later became
the basis of Shop's defense against Trinity's claim that the policy created an
assignment. 8
After Trinity filed a negligence action against City, City counterclaimed for
interpleader, 9 and paid $100,000 to the court.2" Thus, City's counterclaim
joined both Shop's and Trinity's claims in the same action. Trinity argued that
it was entitled to the damages City paid, up to the amount Trinity had paid Shop,
because Shop's policy had assigned all claims to Trinity.2' Shop argued that
there was no assignment or, if there was an assignment, it was a partial
assignment giving Trinity a "cause of action only to the extent Trinity paid Shop
for a loss for which Shop could recover from City, Sheriff's Department, or
Beck."22 Shop also argued that Trinity's previous statements that it had a right
to subrogation barred assignment, under the theories of collateral estoppel and
laches.23 The trial court rejected Shop's arguments, and found an assignment of
Shop's claims to Trinity based on the language of the insurance policy.2 The
court awarded $100,000 to Trinity.2"

On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, Shop
argued that the trial court erred in finding that the policy "unambiguously
assigned Shop's cause of action to Trinity," and erred in finding that Trinity was
not estopped from asserting the assignment argument.26 Shop based both
arguments on Trinity's earlier assertion of its right to subrogation, which is
inconsistent with an asserted right to an assignment.27 Shop also argued that

there was not an assignment because the policy's language did not use

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at *8.
19. Interpleader allows a party who is subject to competing claims, which could

result in double liability, to join all claimants in the same action. See Green Valley Seed,
Inc. v. Plenge, 72 S.W.3d 601, 603-04 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
20. Keisker v. Farmer, 90 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Mo. 2002). City paid $100,000 to the

court because it was the statutory limit of City's liability. Id.
21. Id. at 73-74.
22. Keisker, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 7, at *5.
23. Id. at *6.
24. Id. at *7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *8.
27. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 5
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 68

"assignment language."2 The court rejected these arguments, and affirmed the
trial court's decision. 9
However, the Missouri Supreme Court subsequently granted transfer and
reversed the court of appeals' decision.3" After reviewing the terms of the
insurance policy, the court held that it was ambiguous and lacked "clear intent
to create an assignment," thereby giving Trinity a right to subrogation instead of
an assignment."
Im. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under insurance law principles, if an insured individual makes an insurance
claim for a loss caused by a third party, and a provider pays that claim, the
provider may have a right to recover the amount paid.32 The insurer's right to
recovery is based either on the right to subrogation or an assignment of the
insured's claim. Whether there is a right to subrogation or an assignment
determines how and from whom the insurer collects.33 If the insurer has a right
to subrogation, the insured retains the right to bring an action against a third
party.34 In contrast, an assignment transfers the right to bring an action to the
insurer.3
When determining whether an insurance policy creates an assignment or a
right to subrogation, the rules governing the interpretation of insurance policies
are important. If a policy is not ambiguous, it is enforced as written. 36 However,
if it is ambiguous, the policy is generally construed against the insurer. 37 A

28. Id.
29. Id. at *19, *22-23.
30. Keisker v. Farmer, 90 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Mo. 2002).
31. Id. at 74-75.
32. See Kroeker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 105, 110-11 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1971).
33. Holt v. Myers, 494 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); see also Steele v.
Goosen, 329 S.W.2d 703, 711-12 (Mo. 1959). In at least one case the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District has failed to distinguish between a right to subrogation
and an assignment of a claim. See Ewing v. Pugh, 420 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Mo. Ct. App.
1967). However, the court later realized its error. See Holt, 494 S.W.2d at 438. Both

the Western and Southern Districts later recognized the distinction drawn in Holt. See
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jessee, 523 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975);
Alsup v. Green, 517 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (adopting Holt in the
Southern District); State ex rel. Bartlett & Co., Grain v. Kelso, 499 S.W.2d 579, 582
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (adopting Holt in the Western District).
34. Keisker, 90 S.W.3d at 74.

35. Id.
36. Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., 827 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. 1992).
37. Id.
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policy may be ambiguous if there is "duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in
the meaning of the words used."3
A. Subrogation
The right to subrogation originated at common law,39 and was "founded on
principles of justice and equity."4 As an equitable principle, subrogation is
supposed to ensure that the person who actually caused damages will eventually
pay for those damages.4
Subrogation is classified as either conventional subrogation, which is based
on an "act or agreement of the parties,"4 2 or legal subrogation, which arises "out
of a condition or relationship by operation of law."43 More specifically, a
provider's right to subrogation arises by operation of law when it pays either a
portion or the entire amount of property damages an insured individual claims
under a policy." As a result, a right to subrogation may exist even without a
statute or agreement that provides for it.45
Subrogation is generally defined as "[t]he principle under which an insurer
that has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and
remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to any loss
covered by the policy."" However, this definition does not clearly describe the
actual application of subrogation. In Missouri, the general rule is that if a person
pays for another individual's injury or loss resulting from the actions of a third
party, and the payment is made "pursuant to a legal obligation to do so," that
person is subrogated to the injured party's rights against the third party.47

38. Id.

39. Cole v. Morris, 409 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Mo. 1966); see also Kroeker v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
40. Cole, 409 S.W.2d at 671.
41. Id.
42. Kroeker, 466 S.W.2d at 110 (citing Cole, 409 S.W.2d at 668).
43. Id.; see also Robert M. Smith, Note, What Happenedto the Equity in Equitable

Subrogation?, 64 MO. L. REV. 503, 505 (1999) (summarizing the different types of
subrogation).
44. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Effertz, 795 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see
also Hagar v. Wright Tire & Appliance, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
45. Cole, 409 S.W.2d at 670.
46. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999).
47. Cole, 409 S.W.2d at 670.

As a general rule, any person who, pursuant to a legal obligation to do so, has
paid even indirectly, for a loss or injury resulting from the wrong or default
of another will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor or injured person

against the wrongdoer or defaulter, persons who stand in the shoes of the
wrongdoer, or others who, as the payor, are primarily responsible for the
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When an insurance provider has a right of subrogation to an insured's
claims, it has an equitable right to the claim." However, the insured retains the
legal right to the claim, whether the insurer pays for all or only a portion of the
insured's damages.49 "Recovery for damages from a third party does not, in and
of itself, destroy legal ownership and the right to maintain an action."5 As a
result of the insured's legal title to the claim, the insurer cannot bring any claims
against the third party in its own name." Instead, the insurer must "assert its
subrogation interest against any recovery the insured makes against the
tortfeasor."'52 Another possible option for the insurer is to bring an action in the
name of the insured." If an insured has already brought a claim against a third
party, Missouri law does not require joinder of the insurer, even if the third party
brings a motion to do so. 4
B. Assignment
An assignment varies from subrogation in both the method of creation and
the results produced. In general terms, an assignment is "a transfer or making
over to another of the whole of any property, real or personal, in possession or
in action."55
For parties to create a valid assignment of a claim, Missouri law requires
that they assign the entire claim from one party to another, and must "necessarily
contemplat[e] the continued existence of the .

.

.

[assigned] claim.""

Furthermore, an assignment of the entire claim occurs even if the insured was
required to pay a deductible, and therefore did not receive the entire cost of the
damages incurred.57

wrong or default.
Kroeker, 466 S.W.2d at 110.
48. Holt v. Myers, 494 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
49. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Effertz, 795 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Holt,

494 S.W.2d at 437. In some other states, "legal title to a property damage claim passes
to the injured party's insurer once the insurer pays the insured party's claim." Hagar v.
Wright Tire & Appliance, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
50. Klein v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
51. Hagar,33 S.W.3d at 610.
52. Id.
53. Klein, 714 S.W.2d at 902-03 ("If the interest of the insurer is derived by

subrogation, the action must be brought by or at least in the name of the insured.").
54. Rust v. Hammons, 929 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
55. Kroeker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Mo. Ct. App.
1971).
56. Id. at I10.
57. See e.g., Steele v. Goosen, 329 S.W.2d 703, 711 (Mo. 1959); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jessee, 523 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
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It is also important to note that an assignment of an entire cause of action
may occur even if the language of the assignment limits the insurer's rights.5 8
For example, in Steele v. Goosen an agreement limited the insurer's rights to the
amount that it had paid the insured.59 The Steele court stated that it was
"immaterial" that the agreement imposed such a limitation because these terms
were not enough to support the contention that the policy did not assign the
entire cause of action.6 ° Although specific words are not required to create an
assignment, one party must have actual intent to receive an assignment, and the
other party must have actual intent to make an assignment. 6' This intent must be
apparent from surrounding circumstances.62
Missouri courts have also addressed whether an assignment is allowed
despite the general rule against splitting a cause of action. In GeneralExchange
InsuranceCorp. v. Young,63 the court recognized the rule that an "assignment of
a part of a single cause of action does not entitle the assignee to bring a suit at
' The court also stated that a single
law unless the defendant consents thereto."64
plaintiff may not bring "separate suits for personal injuries and damages to
property caused by the same wrongful act."65 At issue was whether or not there
was an exception to these rules when the assignment was made from an insured
individual to the insurance provider.66 The court stated that the rule requiring
personal and property damage claims resulting from a single occurrence to be
brought in the same action does not apply unless the same person has the right
of action for both claims.67 Therefore, an insured individual may assign rights
to property damage claims before the damage occurs and may retain rights to
personal injury claims without violating the rule against splitting claims.6 The
court stated that in such situations "it is more accurate to say there has been no
'
split of the cause of action, but the creation of two separate causes of action."69

58. Steele, 329 S.W.2d at 711-12.
59. Id. at 711.
60. Id.
61. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Effertz, 795 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
62. Id.
63. 212 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. 1948). In Young, the insured assigned her "entire claim
for damages to the car" to the insurance provider. Id. at 399. The insurer sued for
damages, and recovered the amount it had paid to the insured. Id. After the insured
settled with the insurance provider, she then brought a suit for personal injuries against
the individual whose negligence allegedly caused her automobile accident. Id. at 397.
64. Id. at 398-99. The court stated that this general rule had been announced in
at 398.
numerous cases relied on by appellant. Id. For a list of those cases, see id.
65. Id. at 399.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 400.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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If insured individuals have claims that could be brought under their policies,
and they assign their entire claim to the provider, the insured individuals no
longer have any right to bring an action for damages that would have been
covered under the policy.7" The assignee insurance provider acquires all rights
to the claim, including legal title.7 Therefore, the insurer may bring an action
against the third party tortfeasor.72
C. Real Party in Interest
Whether there is an assignment of a cause of action or a right to subrogation
determines who is entitled to bring a lawsuit against a third party tortfeasor. As
Missouri courts have stated,
The firmly established rule in Missouri, although apparently obtaining
only in this jurisdiction, is that when an insurer pays a property loss,
then its right to maintain suit against the tortfeasor depends upon
whether it receives from the insured an assignment of the whole claim
as compared with merely rights of subrogation."
The individual who possesses the right to bring the lawsuit is referred to as the
"real party in interest."74
The "real party in interest" rule allows only individuals who are "directly
interested in the subject matter of litigation and entitled to reap its fruits" to
maintain an action.7" The purpose of this rule is to protect individuals from
"harassment and multiple suits by persons who would not be bound by the
principles of res adjudicata if they were prevented from bringing subsequent
'
actions by a real party in interest rule."76
The real party in interest rule prevents both the insurance provider and the
insured from suing separately for property damages.77 Under Missouri law,

70. Hagar v. Wright Tire & Appliance, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000); Holt v. Myers, 494 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
71. Hagar,33 S.W.3d at 610.
72. Id.; Kroeker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971) (citing Hayes v. Jenkins, 337 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)).
73. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jessee, 523 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975).
74. Welch v. Davis, Nos. WD 6189, WD 61731, 2003 WL 21321178, at *5(Mo.
Ct. App. June 10, 2003) (citing Janssen v. Guar. Land Title Co., 571 S.W.2d 702, 706
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).
75. Holt v. Myers, 494 S.W.2d 430, 435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Smith v.
Cowen, 350 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)).
76. Id.
77. Jessee, 523 S.W.2d at 835.
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either the insurer or the insured has the right to the cause of action against the
tortfeasor.7" "Missouri courts have constantly denied splitting of [claims for]
damages, so as to allow the insurance company to sue for only that portion of the
loss paid by it, with the insured retaining the right to sue for the balance."79
In summary, if an insured makes an assignment of claims to the insurer, the
insurer is the real party in interest."0 The insurer is also the real party in interest
if it has only paid the insured a portion of the damages but receives an
assignment of the entire claim." On the other hand, if the insurer has a right to
subrogation, the insured remains the real party in interest, 2 and the provider may
not bring an action in its own name. 3 This rule applies even if a provider has
paid an individual's entire claim. 4 However, this does not prevent the insurance
provider from settling with the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer.8"
D. Other Jurisdictions
Although many jurisdictions, like Missouri, deny a provider the right to
bring an action against a third party when the insurer does not receive an
assignment, state subrogation laws vary greatly.86 Ofparticular interest are those
jurisdictions that allow an insurer to bring an action in its own name after paying
the insured for a portion of the damages resulting from a third party's actions.
For example, the United States Supreme Court and other courts have
indicated that both the insured and the provider may, as real parties in interest,

78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Holt, 494 S.W.2d at 438.
81. Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 212 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Mo. 1948).

82. Holt, 494 S.W.2d at 437.
83. Farmers Ins, Co. v. Effertz, 795 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
84. Hayes v. Jenkins, 337 S.W.2d 259, 261 (1960) (rejecting defendant's
contention that if the insurance provider has paid the insured for all damages, the
insurance provider becomes the real party in interest, whether or not there was a
deductible amount that the insured was not paid).
85. See Hagar v. Wright Tire & Appliance, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 605,611 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001). In Hagar,the insurer did not have a right of subrogation until after the tortfeasor
had been found liable. Id. Despite this, the tortfeasor's insurer settled with the plaintiff's
insurer. Id. Subsequently, the injured party brought a claim against the tortfeasor, and
was awarded over $200,000. Id. at 609. The defendant ended up paying both the injured
party and his insurer. Id. at 611.
86. See V. Woemer, Annotation, Proper Party Plaintiff,Under Real Party in
Interest Statute, to Action Against Tortfeasorfor Damage to InsuredProperty Where
Insured Has PaidPart of Loss, 13 A.L.R.3D 140 (1967); see also June F. Entman,
CompulsoryJoinderof CompensatingInsurers: FederalRuleof CivilProcedure19 and
the Role of Substantive Law, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1994) (summarizing the
various approaches to subrogation and the real party in interest concept).
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bring claims against the third party. 7 This applies only if the insurance provider
has paid for only a portion of the insured's loss.88 As the Court in United States
v. Aetna Casualty& Surety Co. 9 stated, "both insured and insurer 'own' portions
of the substantive right [against the tortfeasor] and should appear in litigation in
their own name."90
New York allows both the insurance provider and the insured to bring an
action against a third party who allegedly caused damage to the insured.9 Under
New York law, if an insurer has paid the insured for a portion of their loss, the
insurer may bring an action against the third party for that amount.92 Allowing
the insurer to bring these claims does not affect the insured's right to bring an
action against the third party for any damages that the insured has not paid for.93
The insured's right is not affected because, upon the insurer's partial payment
to the insured, the cause of action against the third party is split between the
insured and the insurer.94 Furthermore, at least one New York court has stated
that the insurer is a necessary and proper party to an action brought by the
insured against the third party.95
Virginia takes a different approach under its rules of civil procedure,
requiring that a provider notify an insured if it is going to bring a cause of action
against a third party in the insured's name.96 The notice ensures that the
insurer's action does not prevent the insured from bringing an action for personal

87. See, e.g., Bryan v. S. Pac. Co., 286 P.2d 761,766 (Ariz. 1955) ("[I]f the insured

does not seek to recover all the damages but only that portion for which he has not been
compensated by his insurer, there being two substantive rights, a tort-feasor by such
splitting of the cause of action might be compelled to defend two suits for one wrong.
This result can be avoided by compelling thejoinder of the insurer on timely application
of the defendant."); Harlem Cab Ass'n v. Diggs, 82 A.2d 143 (D.C. 1951) (citing United
States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949)); State ex rel. Nawd's T.V. &
Appliance, Inc. v. Dist. Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 543 P.2d 1336, 1338
(Mont. 1975).
88. See, e.g., Nawd's T. V., 543 P.2d at 1338 ("When an insurance carrier pays only
part of its insured's loss because the loss exceeds the coverage of the insurance policy or
the policy contains a deductible amount, both the insured and the carrier have a claim for

relief against the wrongdoer and either may bring suit in his own name to the extent of
his respective claim.").
89. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
90. Id. at 381.
91. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 552 N.E.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. 1990).
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. See Townsend v. Halbert, 54 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
95. Id.

96. Lopez v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Group, 583 A.2d 602, 606 (Vt. 1990) (citing
VT. R. Civ. P. 17(c)).
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injuries.97 However, the insured is not required to notify its insurance provider
if he is going to bring a suit, because the insurer "may sue for property damage
in its own name as [a] real party in interest even after a judgment for the assured
on the personal injury claim."9 Therefore, an insurer does not lose its cause of
action even if the insured has already brought a lawsuit. 99
Other courts have declared that an insurance provider is a necessary party
to an action brought by an insured individual against a third party to recover
damages, if the insurer has paid the insured for a portion or all of the damages. "'
The insured may also be a necessary party in a case where both the insurer and
the insured have a cause of action, and the insurer brings an action.'0 '
Even in jurisdictions where the insurer has not been deemed a necessary
party, the insurer may be allowed to intervene in the action. 2 The Fourth
Circuit stated that "it is elementary" that if an insurer has paid an insured for a
portion of the damages it incurred as a result of a third party's action, the insurer
is entitled to recover that amount and may join the insured in a lawsuit against
the third party to do so, even where the insured holds a "single indivisible cause
of action."' 03
IV. INSTANT DECISION
InKeiskerv. Farmer, 4 Judge Benton delivered the opinion of a unanimous
Missouri Supreme Court.'05 After reviewing the facts relevant to the case and
summarizing the trial court's decision, the court stated that the "threshold issue"
was whether the policy gave Trinity an assignment or a right to subrogation. "°
Noting that the creation of an assignment requires a party's intent to do so, the
court rejected Trinity's argument that the "transfer" language used in the policy

97. Id. (citing VT. R. Civ. P. 17(c) Reporter's Notes).

98. Id. (citing VT.R. Civ. P. 17(c) Reporter's Notes).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Waters v. Bigelow, 310 P.2d 624, 624, 626-27 (Or. 1957) (holding

that upon defendant's motion, an insurer who has paid for a portion of an insured's loss
must be joined as a necessary party).
101. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1949).
102. See, e.g., Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Carolina Peanut Co., 186 F.2d 816, 820
(4th Cir. 1951).
103. Id.
104. 90 S.W.3d 71 (Mo. 2002).

105. Id. at 73, 75. Judge Teitelman did not participate in this decision. Id. at 75.
106. Id. at 74. The court reviewed the case de novo because it involved a question
of law-the interpretation of an insurance policy. Id.
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unambiguously created an assignment.107 The court concluded that Shop did not
have the necessary intent to assign the cause of action." 8
Next, the court summarily concluded that, in this case, the phrase "to the
extent of our payments" limited Trinity's rights based on the context." 9 The
court also addressed the terms of the policy that allowed Shop to waive its rights
against others in certain circumstances." 0 It concluded that these terms also
limited Trinity's rights and noted that these limitations were inconsistent with an
assignment."' Furthermore, the terms of the policy contradicted one another," 2
providing that Shop "must do nothing after loss to impair [Trinity's rights]," but
also allowing Shop to waive its rights "against another party... [a]fter a loss"
if that party had a specified relationship with Shop at the time of the loss." 3 The
court found that these terms were ambiguous and must be construed against
Trinity."
This ambiguity, combined with no clear intent to create an
assignment, gave Trinity a right of subrogation. "5
Trinity also argued that it was entitled to the $100,000 based on its right of
subrogation." 6 Recognizing that Shop's suit against City was for lost income
and profits, the court indicated that Trinity's right to subrogation was limited to
the $15,000 it paid Shop for lost profits as long as Shop could prove lost profits
of at least $106,000.'
This number was calculated based on the amount of
money Shop received from Trinity for lost profits and the amount of money Shop
had or would receive from others involved in the accident: $15,000 from Trinity
for lost profits, $6,000 from the second driver, and $85,000 of the money City
deposited with the court."' Through subrogation, Trinity would receive the
remaining $15,000 that had been deposited with the court. "'

107. Id. "No particular form of words is necessary to accomplish an assignment,
so long as there appears from the circumstances an intention on the one side to assign.
.. and on the other side to receive." Id. (quoting Farmers Ins. Co. v. Effertz, 795 S.W.2d
424, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. Id.
113. Id. at 73-74.
114. Id. at74.
115. Id. at 74-75.
116. Id. at 75 (citing Tucker v. Holder, 225 S.W.2d 123, 126 (1949)) ("Subrogation
exists to prevent unjust enrichment.").
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. However, Trinity's "share of the litigation expenses" limits its recovery.
Id. "Where one litigates to create a fund for others, those sharing must contribute a
proportional part of the expenses." Id. (citing Leggett v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 342
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SUBROGATION AND ASSIGNMENT
V. COMMENT

Understanding the intricacies of Missouri's insurance law is important for
insured individuals, providers and any third parties who are liable for the
insured's damages when an insurance claim is brought. Trinity's mistaken
assumption that it had the right to bring a lawsuit against City following Shop's
lawsuit demonstrates a possible misunderstanding of Missouri law in the
insurance industry. Contrary to Trinity's assumption, it could not sue City in its
own name to recover the amount it had paid to Shop for property damages. 2 '
After determining that Trinity had a right to subrogation, and not an
assignment, the court stated that following Shop's suit, Trinity was not allowed
to bring an action against City, despite the fact that Shop's claim for damages did
not include any portion of the damages that Trinity had paid. In order for other
insurers to increase the likelihood that they will eventually recover the amount
of money that they have paid to insureds, several issues should be kept in mind.
The ability to establish that one party had the intent to assign a cause of action,
and that the other party had the intent to receive an assignment is the most
important element of an insurer's argument that it has received an assignment.
Closely related to the requirement of intent is the language that is used in the
insurance policy. Keeping in mind that if an insurance policy is ambiguous it
will be construed against the insurer, it is important that the language clearly set
forth both the insured's and insurer's rights."' Using layman's terms to explain
the policy, as compared to technical and legal terms, will also increase the
likelihood that the policy will be interpreted as intended.' 22
Although the result in Keisker is consistent with previous cases decided
under Missouri law, it is not consistent with the stated purpose of the right to
subrogation. Missouri courts have repeatedly stated that the underlying purpose
in granting an insurer the right to subrogation is ensuring equity and justice.'23
However, as applied, the law prevents an insurer from participating in a cause
of action against third parties who are actually liable for the insured's damages.

S.W.2d 833, 936 (Mo. 1960); Jourdan v. Gilmore, 638 S.W.2d 763, 768-69 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982)). Therefore, the amount of Trinity's litigation expenses is the proportion of
its recovery "to the total cash recovery by both Trinity and the Shop." Id.
120. Id.
121. See supranotes 36-38 and accompanying text.
122. See Martin v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. 1999)
(quoting Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. 1997))
("When interpreting the language of an insurance policy, this Court gives a term its
ordinary meaning, unless it plainly appears that a technical meaning was intended. The
ordinary meaning of a term is the meaning that the average layperson would reasonably
understand. 'To determine the ordinary meaning of a term, this Court consults standard
English language dictionaries."').

123. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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As Keisker demonstrates, the insured is not under any obligation to bring a
lawsuit against the third party claiming damages that the insured has already paid
for. Instead, the insured has discretion to determine which claims to bring. As
a result, the provider may pay for damages that never become the basis of the
insured's lawsuit against the individual who caused the damages. This result
does not serve the purpose of subrogation because it does not ensure that the
person who caused the damages is the person paying for them.
Adopting and applying the laws of differentjurisdictions would better serve
the underlying purposes of subrogation, considering that subrogation was
"founded on principles of justice and equity."' 24 For example, under Aetna
Casualty or New York law Trinity would probably have had the right to bring
an action against City in its own name to recover the amount that it had paid to
Shop for property damages.' 25 Under these laws, both Trinity and Shop would
have been entitled to bring a claim against City. As a result, the person actually
liable for the damages would also pay for them. This would also probably have
been the outcome under Virginia law. 2 s In comparison, Missouri law requires
the insured to be particularly careful to create an assignment of a claim from the
insured if it would like to retain the right to recover damages from the person
actually liable for them.

VI. CONCLUSION
27
In Keisker v. Farner,'
the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the
differences between assignment and subrogation, finding that Trinity, lacking
intent to create an assignment, had a right to subrogation. As a result, Trinity did
not have a cause of action against City. 2 Although this decision did not alter
the course of Missouri insurance law, it did raise several important yet often
misunderstood issues. The concepts of subrogation, assignment, and the real
party in interest are central to understanding the inner workings of the insurance
system.

JENNIFER A. BUELER

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Cole v. Morris, 409 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Mo. 1966).
See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
90 S.W.3d 71 (Mo. 2002).
Id. at 74-75.
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